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During recent years the Harvard University Press has 
published a growing collection of source books in the history of 
the sciences. Of these volumes, three specifically concern the 
history of mathematics: G. Birkhoff [1973], D. Struik [1969], 
and the present work. Here van Heijenoort has collected forty- 
six documents in mathematical logic, beginning with Gottlob 
Frege's Begriffschrift of 1879 and concluding with Jacques 
Herbrand's 1931 response to Kurt Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. 
As the editor wished to avoid misinterpretation through lack of 
context, all but five of the papers are reproduced in their 
entirety. He and several assistants have carefully translated 
papers into English from six languages. In collaboration with 
Burton Dreben, Charles Parsons, W. V. Quine, and Hao Wang, the 
editor has written an informative and thoughtful introduction to 
each selection, Further, this second printing corrects a 
number of minor errors found in the first edition, as well as a 
more serious misinterpretation of Herbrand by Dreben. 
Although the selections are reprinted chronologically, 
there are several well-defined themes around which groups of 
papers coalesce. First, Frege in 1879 and Giuseppe Peano in 
1889 introduced symbolic languages with quantification and 
applied them to mathematics. Second, from 1897 to 1905 set- 
theoretic and logical paradoxes appeared in communications by 
Cesare Burali-Forti, Georg Cantor, Bertrand Russell, Frege, 
Jules Richard, and Julius Konig. Third, in 1908 and 1910 Russell 
responded to the paradoxes with his theory of types. Fourth, 
from 1904 to 1925 set theory was developed and axiomatized by 
Ernst Zermelo, Abraham Fraenkel, Thoralf Skolem, and John von 
Neumann. Fifth, between 1923 and 1927 intuitionism was furthered 
by L. E. J. Brouwer, A. N. Kolmogorov, and Hermann Weyl. Sixth, 
during the years 1925-1931 proof theory was developed--often in 
creative opposition to intuitionism--by David Hilbert, Paul 
Bernays, Wilhelm Ackermann, Herbrand, and Godel. Seventh, 
semantics received attention from Leopold Lbwenheim in 1915, 
Skolem in both 1920 and 1928, and Godel in 1930. 
These very groupings raise questions as to the choice of 
papers and the scope of the book. For a source book cannot help 
but be, in a sense, a history. In the view of the reader and 
presumably of the editor, the dates which delimit a source book 
mark watersheds. Likewise, the choice or omission of particular 
papers gives a measure of their importance. Thus it is essential 
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that the editor of a source book make his selections with an 
awareness of their historical importance--and the criteria for 
that importance. Judged on this basis, the book under review 
has substantial flaws. 
Why did van Heijenoort choose to begin his source book in 
1879? As he himself emphasized, it was because the publication 
of Frege's Begriffschrift opened “[a] great epoch in the history 
of logic . . .‘I (p. vi) But the editor knew that he must make a 
case for not beginning with the work of George Boole, dating 
from 1847 to 1854. After all, as I. Bochenski [1970, 2671 wrote 
in his history of logic, it was Boole “who founded a school, and 
who stands at the beginning of the continuous development of 
mathematical logic. ” Unfortunately, the case made by van 
Heijenoort for ignoring Boole and his school was one whose 
weakness was not redeemed by its brevity: “The multiplicity of 
interpretations of what became known as Boolean algebra created 
confusion and for a time was a hindrance rather than an advantage. 
Considered by itself, the period would, no doubt, leave its 
mark upon the history of logic, but it would not count as a great 
epoch.” (p. vi) 
Having underestimated Boole, van Heijenoort described 
Frege’s Begriffschrift as “perhaps the most important single 
work ever written in logic” (p. 1)--a remark strangely oblivi- 
ous of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Unfortunately (for history 
rarely happens as it ought to have happened), Frege’s influence 
on the history of mathematical logic was limited. Russell’s 
logic, for instance, was influenced mainly by Peano and included 
independent rediscoveries of a number of Frege’s ideas. Was it 
then appropriate to devote one-eighth of this lengthy source 
book to the Begriffschrift? Frege’s third section on sequences 
could reasonably have been omitted, just as the editor left 
out the latter part of Peano’s 1889 book. 
Indeed, what criteria were used for inclusion of material? 
In the following selections Frege is rarely mentioned (except 
by Russell), while Ernst Schroder (of whose work van Heijenoort 
reprinted nothing) appears often, especially in the ground- 
breaking papers of Lowenheim and Skolem. One may ask: If 
influence on later developments was a primary criterion for 
inclusion, why is Frege represented but not Schroder? And if 
influence was less important than intrinsic merit, why is Frege 
reprinted but not C. S. Peirce? After all, Peirce developed a 
Boolean logic with quantifiers, influenced Schroder, and was as 
astute a logician as Frege. 
One may also question the chronological balance of se- 
lections. Of the period 1879-1931, half the book is devoted to 
the first 44 years and half to the last nine years. This does 
not properly reflect either the quantity or the quality of 
mathematical logic done in the periods 1879-1922 and 1923-1931. 
Moreover, there is no lack of significant works from the earlier 
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period that were not reprinted. Such, for instance, are the 
critical writings of Henri Poincare (especially the Russell- 
Couturat-PoincarG debate of 19051906) and L. E. J. Brouwer's 
doctoral thesis of 1907. Indeed, the reviewer fails to under- 
stand why selections from Brouwer's work on intuitionism begin 
only in 1923. 
Furthermore, many of the selections, especially from the 
192Os, can be construed as part of mathematical logic only by 
broadening the term to include the foundations of mathematics, 
and set theory in particular. In a source book as long as this 
one, it might have been well to consider only mathematical logic. 
Then additional important papers could have been included. But 
since the editor chose to extend the subject so greatly, his 
title and introduction should have alerted the reader to this 
extension. 
Even if the scope of this source book is broadened to 
include the foundations of mathematics, one may wonder whether 
it was necessary to include both of Zermelo's proofs of the 
theorem that every set can be well-ordered. This reviewer 
suspects that the controversy over that theorem would be better 
portrayed by omitting one of the proofs but including the five 
letters exchanged on the subject in 1905 by Rene Baire, Emile 
Borel, Jacques Hadamard, and Henri Lebesgue. 
Of the omissions in this source book, one of the most 
surprising and least justifiable is that of Polish logic. After 
World War I there arose in Poland a number of fine mathematical 
logicians such as Stefan Lesniewski, Jan Lukasiewicz, and Alfred 
Tarski. Although their most important work was done in the 
thirties, important contributions occurred as early as 1920. 
To have included this work, however, might have conceded that 
Godells Incompleteness Theorem of 1931 was not, after all, a 
critical watershed in mathematical logic. 
There appear to be no errors of fact in the book, with one 
exception. Van Heijenoort claims (p. 142) that the comments to 
Richard's paradox (when in 1905 it appeared in Revue gh6rale 
des sciences pures et appliquBes) were written by Louis Olivier, 
then editor of the Revue. In fact, the comments were anonymous. 
Were it not for a 1905 letter of Hadamard to Borel, we might not 
know that the comments were written by Hadamard, who was then 
handling all mathematical questions found in the Revue. 
In sum, we are fortunate to have this source book, par- 
ticularly for its many translations and excellent introductory 
comments. Regrettably, the competence found in the translations 
and introductions was not matched by the choice of selections 
and the scope of the book. 
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During the 17th century, optics underwent radical changes. 
New laws and phenomena were discovered which led to a better 
understanding of the nature of light. Men who were active in 
this pioneering development were e.g. Kepler, Descartes, Newton 
and Huygens. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) lived in that period, 
and after 1630, when he wrote his first optical paper, optics 
was an integral part of his scientific activities. Yet, Hobbes' 
influence on that development was only indirect, the reason for 
this being that his major optical work, Tractatus opticus (1644), 
was relatively inaccessible as the seventh book of Marin Mersenne's 
Optics in Universae geometricae, mixtaque synopsis et bini 
refractionum demonstratum tractatus. 
Hobbes' De Homine was published in 1658 when he was 70 
years old. The optical part is essentially a Latin translation 
of the second part of A minute or first Draught of the Optiques 
which Hobbes wrote in 1646. De Homine was translated into 
German in 1918, except for the optical part, and into Italian 
in 1970. The book under review is a translation into French, 
including a preface, an introduction and a set of annotations. 
As far as I can judge, the translation is elegant and scholarly. 
The figures are reproductions taken from the original text. 
Originally, Hobbes had the intention of writing a trilogy, 
De Corpore, De Homine, and De Cive, treating physics, physiology 
and politics, written within the framework of the new philosophy, 
that is from a mechanistic point of view. This programme was 
not carried out in that order. me Give was published in 1642, 
De Corpore in 1655, and De Homine in 1658. The last is rather 
strangely composed. After an introduction follow eight chapters 
on language of science, attraction and aversion, the passions, 
and religion. In the preface, Vasco Ronchi gives his own explan- 
ation of the structure of the book. Hobbes was seventy when 
he wrote, but much of the material for it was already written 
many years before. He did not feel so very enthusiastic about 
it any longer, but still felt a kind of obligation to fulfill 
the programme. Therefore, he simply put together what was before 
him, without trying to unify the material properly. 
